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What Does Consciousness Have to Do
With It? Quality of Life in Patients With
Disorders of Consciousness
Lily Frank, Eindhoven University of Technology
Michal Klincewicz, Jagiellonian University
L. Syd M Johnson’s article argues for caution in the clinical
practices surrounding prognostication for patients with
disorders of consciousness (DOC). The epistemic limita-
tions of current neuroscience and the pressures that surro-
gates and physicians face when making decisions about
continuing or withdrawing treatment create an urgency
for further research into how to understand, measure, and
manage quality of life in these patients. Because of this, the
relationship between conscious experience and other psy-
chological functions that would inform such a research
program needs to be carefully examined.
The extant literature on the nature of conscious experi-
ence shows that it is highly controversial what role, if any,
consciousness plays in psychological functioning. Con-
sider reasoning and the thoughts and beliefs that it pur-
portedly involves. These psychological states bear
intentional content—that is, they are about something in
the same way that sentences are about something. But
whatever the functional role of intentional content in rea-
soning is, it is connected to that aboutness and not to con-
sciousness (Rosenthal 2008). A thought may have the
content “Tuesdays come just before Wednesdays of the
same week.” This thought, together with another thought
with the content “today is Tuesday,” licenses the inference
to another thought with the content “tomorrow is
Wednesday” irrespective of whether it is conscious. The
same is true of beliefs. Consider a belief that “Tuesdays
come just before Wednesdays of the same week.” This
belief does not explicitly figure in inferences about week-
end plans, even though it implicitly informs every such
inference. Perceptual states primarily allow us to make dis-
criminations in the environment, and again, this is inde-
pendent of whether they are accompanied by conscious
awareness; perception can occur without awareness (Prinz
2015). Finally, emotional states are notorious for their influ-
ence outside of consciousness (Wyer 2014; Bargh 2007).
What all of this amounts to is that it is at least controversial
whether consciousness plays a significant (or any) role in
the functionings of emotions, perceptions, and intentional
states, such as thoughts and beliefs. Put bluntly, conscious-
ness might not matter that much as far as the rest of our
psychology is concerned (Rosenthal 2008).
If consciousness is not that important to other mental
functions, then this raises the question of whether it should
be important in the assessment of quality of life and deci-
sions about treatment for patients with DOC. Perhaps
when doctors use the word “consciousness” they refer to
an amalgam of other psychological capacities, such as
emotions, thoughts, and so on. If that is so, then they are
simply using the word in a way that obscures the connec-
tion to quality-of-life assessment. Another possibility is
that “consciousness” in this context refers not to a state
that is phenomenally conscious, but to the whole organism
that is in a state that contrasts with being asleep or in a
coma (Rosenthal 1986; Block 1995). But this cannot be the
type of consciousness to which DOC refers, since there is a
clear clinical distinction between states like unresponsive
wakefulness syndrome (formerly the vegetative state), in
which the patient exhibits demarcated sleep–wake cycles,
and states like the coma where this is not the case.
Although quality of life is a contested concept that is
theorized about in economics, philosophy, and psychol-
ogy, it is uncontroversial that emotions, perceptions,
thoughts, and beliefs are a part of a person’s quality of life.
And it is these types of mental states that play an impor-
tant role in nearly every form of quality-of-life assessment.
Probably the most robust quantitative instruments for this
purpose have been developed in the field of medicine and
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health economics. These health-related quality of life
(HRQOL) measures are used primarily for the purposes of
making national and international health policies, specifi-
cally, deciding to which interventions, medicines, and
devices scarce financial resources should be allocated.
Measurements like quality adjusted life years (QALYS)
allow for comparisons to be made across a wide range of
diseases, conditions, and patient groups. HRQOL meas-
urements take into account the “physical, psychological,
and social domains of health, seen as distinct areas (or
domains) that are influenced by a person’s experiences,
beliefs, expectations, and perceptions” (Testa and Simon-
son 1996, 55).
There are many different instruments for measuring
HRQOL: some for specific diseases and conditions, and
others for particular domains, like pain or depression, as
well as generic instruments. These instruments can be
adapted to assess the quality of life of patients with DOC,
but then one is immediately presented with the problem
that they rely on gathering data through self-reports, that
is, asking patients things like “How much time during the
past month have you felt downhearted and depressed?”
(SF-12). There is a body of research on the HRQOL of peo-
ple with cognitive disabilities and dementia. These assess-
ments usually rely on one or a combination of patient self-
report (to the extent that it is possible), observation of
patient behavior, and proxy reports by caretakers or family
members (Logsdon et al. 2002). For patients with DOC
none of these methods can be straightforwardly imple-
mented. Some attempts have also been made to develop
QOL measures for neonates in the intensive care unit.
They share with patients with DOCs an inability to issue
self-reports. Assessments of neonates’ quality of life by
proxy are also unreliable because of the likelihood that the
proxy’s assessment reflects his or her own QOL, rather
than the patient’s (Boss et al. 2012). Another feature these
two groups share is that projected future QOL, rather than
present QOL, is often taken to be the more relevant factor
when making decisions about treatment (Boss et al. 2012,
902). Boss and colleagues recommend using a combination
of physiological data, proxy reports, and dimensions that
are specifically thought to be relevant to the well-being of
infants, such as level of light exposure, skin contact, and
invasive procedures, to begin to understand HRQOL in
neonates. Just as for infants or the cognitively impaired,
HRQOL assessment will have to be specifically tailored to
patients with DOC and will likely have to involve a range
of types of measures. Johnson’s article gives us several rea-
sons to think that the development of such measures is
crucial. First, medicine does not have a very high success
rate at predicting recovery from or improvement in disor-
ders of consciousness, and standard practice is to err on
the side of a pessimistic prediction about recovery and life
prospects. As Johnson suggests, giving these patients more
time to stabilize and to watch for changes and improve-
ments may be prudent advice for the surrogate decision
makers for these patients. If it does indeed become stan-
dard practice to adopt this wait and see approach, then
there is an even higher obligation on the part of medicine
to strive to be able to give surrogates insights into the cur-
rent quality of life of the patients, as well as their predicted
future quality of life. In order to weigh the costs and bene-
fits of waiting for recovery for an additional several
months, surrogates require some information, at the very
least, that the patient is not in severe pain or mental dis-
tress or that these symptoms are being controlled. Of
course, this is putting aside considerations of cost and
resource allocation, which are beyond the scope of this
short commentary. Another reason why it is crucial to
develop QOL measures for these patients is that standards
of care for patients with a DOC may have to reflect a con-
cern not only for the potential recovery of consciousness,
but for the maintenance of other mental faculties, which
are more closely tied to their quality of life.
In conclusion, patients with DOC, even while
completely unconscious, may nonetheless have psycholog-
ical states relevant to assessment of their quality of life at
that time. There are theoretical and empirical reasons to
think that this is the case. First, for all the reasons we have
mentioned, we can expect psychological states to some-
times occur without consciousness. Second, we know that
some patients with DOC still retain some brain function in
areas that are thought to be involved with sensations, emo-
tions, and even reasoning, even if they have little to no
ability to communicate or express these mental states
(Monti et al. 2010).&
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Deferring to the Best Inferrer? Ethically
Inferring on Behalf of Patients With
Disorders of Consciousness
Valerye M. Milleson, Albany Medical College
While L. Syd Johnson has elucidated some very real prob-
lems with current inferences in and the corresponding
medical management of patients with disorders of con-
sciousness (DOCs) and offered a worthwhile preliminary
set of suggested clinical responses to these problems, from
the perspective of one currently working in clinical ethics
consultation these suggestions do not sufficiently address
the concerns of managing inductive risks in decision mak-
ing regarding patients with DOCs. In this commentary I
discuss what I believe are two particularly problematic
gaps in Johnson’s recommendations and offer a tentative
account of some additional measures that may be useful in
moving forward with managing inductive risks in decision
making for these patients.
One major area of concern is the author’s apparent reli-
ance on surrogate decision making for these patients. At
present, the two primary standards used by surrogates
when deciding on behalf of patients lacking decision-mak-
ing capacity are substituted judgment and best interests,
both of which present challenges in the case of patients
with DOCs. In brief, when a surrogate applies the substi-
tuted judgment standard, he or she “choos[es] as the
incompetent individual would choose in the circumstances
were he or she competent” (Buchanan and Brock 1990,
112). In our scenario, then, a surrogate would be asked to
decide what the patient with DOC would want in terms of
treatment or nontreatment if presently able to understand
his or her medical situation and express those preferences.
The first challenging aspect of this has to do with what it
would mean to understand—and indeed to have a prefer-
ence about—the current medical situation. As Johnson has
pointed out, there is a high degree of uncertainty with
respect to providing accurate medical prognostication in
these cases, leading to inferences about not only the sort of
DOC a patient has (including the corresponding likelihood
of recovery), but also whether or not in that particular
DOC the patient can be or is experiencing suffering. What,
then, can the patient’s preferences be about? On the face of
it, they have to be preferences based on probabilities—but
in our given situation the probabilities themselves are sus-
pect. The uncertainty experienced in the case of patients
with DOCs calls into question the possibility of there even
being preferences other than the extremes of “any chance
at recovery is worth proceeding with treatment” and “no
chance at recovery is worth risking being ‘stuck with life’”
that can be meaningfully substituted on behalf of these
patients. This problem is compounded by the many stud-
ies indicating that surrogates are often unable to accurately
predict a patient’s preferences for treatment or nontreat-
ment in a given medical scenario, including scenarios
where diagnostic and prognostic inferences are far more
certain (Shalowitz, Garrett-Mayer, and Wendler 2006;
Fagerlin et al. 2001). But for patients with DOCs, we are
asking surrogates to make accurate inferences about a
patient’s preferences even when the medical inferences
surrogates have to base them on are highly tenuous, leav-
ing little assurance that the surrogate’s decision will ulti-
mately reflect the patient’s preferences and thereby be “the
option most likely to result in decisions that accord with
the wishes, preferences, and values of the patients
themselves” (Johnson 2016, 40).
The other main standard for surrogate decision mak-
ing, the best interests standard, is no better at offering
guidance in these situations. When a surrogate applies the
best interests standard, he or she is asked to weigh the
pros and cons of the available treatment options and deter-
mine which option is in the best interests of the patient.
Here again, when considering what is in the best interests
of a patient with DOC there will necessarily be a lot of
inferences that are being made. Faced with such high
degrees of variability and uncertainty, it is not clear how
successful any of these inferences can or will be at helping
surrogates determine a course of action that is actually in
the best interest of the patient. If, as Johnson recommends,
DOC patients are granted greater recovery time to allow
for improved diagnostic and prognostic accuracy, these
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